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CIVIL RIGHTS
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Headed to High Court?
With appeals courts in Chicago, Atlanta split on protections under ‘64 Civil Rights Act, issue ripe for review
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
I n what could prove a piv-otal step in the long road toward full equality under the law, Lambda Legal has 
announced it will petition the Su-
preme Court to decide whether Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which bans employment discrimi-
nation because of sex, also bans 
discrimination that is based on 
sexual orientation.
Lambda signaled its intentions on 
July 6, after the 11th Circuit Court 
of Appeals, based in Atlanta, an-
nounced that its full bench would 
not reconsider a three-judge panel 
decision from March 10 rejecting a 
sexual orientation discrimination 
claim by Jameka K. Evans, a lesbian 
security guard, against her former 
employer, Georgia Regional Hospital.
The argument that Title VII 
should be interpreted to cover sexu-
al orientation claims got a big boost 
several months ago when the full 
bench of the Chicago-based Sev-
enth Circuit ruled that a lesbian 
academic, Kimberly Hively, could 
sue an Indiana community college 
for sexual orientation discrimina-
tion under the federal sex discrimi-
nation law, overruling prior panel 
decisions from that circuit.
The Seventh Circuit was the fi rst 
federal appeals court to rule that 
the 1964 Act provided such protec-
tions. Lambda Legal represented 
Hively in that appeal.
Interestingly, Title VII did not 
even include sex as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination when the 
Civil Rights Act got to the fl oor of 
the House of Representatives for 
debate. The measure’s primary fo-
cus was race discrimination. But a 
Virginia representative, Howard W. 
Smith, an opponent of the bill, in-
troduced a fl oor amendment to add 
sex, in an apparent effort to add 
a poison pill making the measure 
too controversial to pass. Smith’s 
amendment won the support of 
similarly-minded conservatives 
but also from liberals interested in 
advancing the employment rights 
of women. Smith’s effort backfi red 
when the amended bill passed the 
House and was sent to the Senate.
There, a lengthy fi libuster over 
the race discrimination provision 
delayed a fl oor vote for months, 
but when it was eventually passed, 
there was not much discussion 
about the meaning of sex as a pro-
hibited ground for employment dis-
crimination. (The sex provision did 
not apply to other parts of the 1964 
Act, so employment protections are 
the only portion of that statute that 
outlawed sex discrimination.)
Within a few years, both the 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and federal 
courts had issued decisions re-
jecting discrimination claims from 
LGBTQ plaintiffs, holding that 
Congress did not intend to address 
homosexuality or transsexualism 
(as it was then called) in the 1964 
law. That judicial consensus did not 
start to break down until after the 
Supreme Court’s 1989 “sex-stereo-
typing” decision in Ann Hopkins’ 
sex discrimination case against 
Price Waterhouse. There, the high 
court concluded Hopkins was ille-
gally denied partnership because 
senior members of the fi rm believed 
she did not conform to their image 
of a proper “lady partner.”
Within a few years, litigators be-
gan to persuade federal judges that 
discrimination claims by trans-
gender plaintiffs also involved sex 
stereotyping. By defi nition, a trans-
gender person does not conform to 
stereotypes about their sex as des-
ignated at birth, and by now a near 
consensus has emerged among the 
federal courts of appeals that dis-
crimination because of gender iden-
tity or expression is a form of sex 
discrimination under the stereotyp-
ing theory. The EEOC changed its 
position as well, following the lead 
of some court decisions, in 2012.
Advocates for gay plaintiffs also 
raised the stereotyping theory, but 
with mixed success. Most federal cir-
cuit courts were unwilling to accept 
it unless the plaintiff could show 
that he or she was gender-noncon-
forming in some obvious way, such 
as effeminacy in men or masculinity 
(akin to the drill sergeant demean-
or of Ann Hopkins) in women. The 
courts generally rejected the argu-
ment that discrimination based on 
an employee’s homosexual or bisex-
ual orientation, in and of itself, was 
proof that their employer impermis-
sibly acted based on stereotypes of 
how a man or woman was supposed 
to act. Some appellate courts, in-
cluding the New York-based Second 
Circuit, ruled that if sexual orienta-
tion was the “real reason” for dis-
crimination, a Title VII claim must 
fail, even if the plaintiff was gender-
nonconforming.
Within the past few years, how-
ever, several district courts and the 
EEOC accepted the stereotyping 
argument and other arguments in-
sisting that discrimination because 
of sexual orientation is always, as 
a practical matter, about the sex of 
the plaintiff. But it was only this 
year that a federal appeals court 
— the Seventh Circuit in the Hively 
case — came around to this view.
A split among the circuits about 
the interpretation of a federal stat-
ute is a key predictor of a case the 
Supreme Court is likely to accept 
for review. Until now, the high court 
has always rejected the invitation to 
consider whether Title VII could be 
interpreted to cover sexual orien-
tation and gender identity claims, 
leaving in place lower court rulings 
that found otherwise.
In 2016, however, the high court 
signaled its interest in the ques-
tion whether sex discrimination, 
as such, includes gender identity 
discrimination when it agreed to 
review a ruling by the Richmond-
based Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which held that the district 
court should not have dismissed a 
sex discrimination claim by Gavin 
Grimm, a transgender high school 
student. Grimm, who was denied 
access to the boys’ bathroom appro-
priate to his gender identity by his 
Gloucester County, Virginia, school, 
fi led suit under Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972, which 
bans sex discrimination by schools 
receiving federal money.
The Fourth Circuit found that 
the district court should have de-
ferred to the Obama administra-
tion’s Department of Education 
interpretation of the Title IX regula-
tions, which tracked the EEOC and 
federal courts in Title VII cases and 
accepted the sex stereotyping theory 
for gender identity discrimination 
claims. Shortly before the Supreme 
Court was scheduled to hear argu-
ments in the Grimm case, however, 
the Trump administration withdrew 
the Obama DOE interpretation, 
pulling the rug out from under the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision. The Su-
preme Court canceled the argument 
and sent the case back to the Fourth 
Circuit, which this fall will hear ar-
gument on the question whether Ti-
tle IX would protect a claimant like 
Grimm even without an interpreta-
tion from the Executive Branch.
Meanwhile, the Title VII issue 
has been percolating in many 
courts around the country. Here 
in New York, several recent Second 
Circuit appellate rulings, citing ex-
isting circuit precedent, have de-
nied sexual orientation discrimi-
nation claims. In some of those 
cases, judges said that the gay 
plaintiff could maintain their Title 
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VII case if they could show gender-
nonconforming behavior suffi cient 
to evoke the stereotyping theory. 
And in one case, the circuit’s chief 
judge wrote a concurring opinion 
suggesting it was time for the full 
bench to reconsider the issue. In 
another case, Zarda v. Altitude Ex-
press, the court recently granted a 
petition for such reconsideration, 
with oral argument scheduled for 
September 26. The EEOC, many 
LGBTQ rights and civil liberties 
organizations, and the attorneys 
general of the three states in the 
circuit — New York, Connecticut, 
and Vermont — have fi led amicus 
briefs, calling on the Second Cir-
cuit to follow the Seventh Circuit’s 
lead on this issue.
The timing in the 11th and Sec-
ond Circuit cases makes for an 
interesting dynamic. Lambda’s 
petition for Supreme Court review 
of the 11th Circuit case must be 
fi led within 90 days of the denial 
of its rehearing petition — that is, 
by early October. Georgia Regional 
Hospital would then have 30 days 
to respond, so a Supreme Court de-
cision on whether to take the case 
could well not come until late Octo-
ber, early November, or later. If the 
court accepts the case, oral argu-
ment would follow in early 2018, 
with a decision by next June.
The question then is how expe-
ditiously the Second Circuit would 
move in the Zarda case. Legal ob-
servers generally believe the circuit 
is poised to follow the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s lead in holding that sexual 
orientation claims can be litigated 
under Title VII, but the circuit’s 
judges may see it as prudent to hold 
up until the Supreme Court either 
rejects review of the 11th Circuit 
case or rules on it.
However, two veteran Second 
Circuit judges have recently bucked 
the circuit precedent, arguing it is 
outmoded and refusing to dismiss 
sexual orientation cases. A few 
years ago, the circuit accepted the 
argument in a race discrimination 
case that an employer violated Ti-
tle VII by discriminating against a 
person for engaging in a mixed-race 
relationship. Some judges see this 
as support for the analogous argu-
ment that discriminating against 
somebody because they are attract-
ed to a person of the same-sex is 
sex discrimination.
It’s worth noting that in the past 
the Second Circuit moved to rule 
quickly on an LGBTQ issue in a 
somewhat similar situation. When 
lawsuits challenging the Defense of 
Marriage Act were moving through 
the federal courts in 2012, there 
was a race among cases from the 
Second Circuit, Boston’s First Cir-
cuit, and San Francisco’s Ninth 
Circuit. The Supreme Court had 
already received a petition to re-
view a First Circuit case — where 
GLAD, the GLBTQ Legal Advocates 
& Defenders, represented the plain-
tiffs — before the Second Circuit 
heard the American Civil Liberties 
Union’s suit on Edie Windsor’s be-
half. But the Second Circuit moved 
quickly, and in the end it was the 
ACLU-Windsor case the high court 
accepted. On June 26, 2013, ruling 
in the Windsor case, the Supreme 
Court gutted the key provision of 
DOMA.
If the Second Circuit moves quick-
ly again, it could turn out an opinion 
before the Supreme Court has an-
nounced whether it will review the 
11th Circuit Evans case. The timing 
might be just right for that.
A key concern for LGBTQ legal 
advocates, of course, is the Supreme 
Court’s composition at the time this 
issue is decided. Right now, the fi ve-
justice majority in the DOMA case 
and the marriage equality case two 
years later holds. But three of them 
— Justices Anthony Kennedy (who 
turns 81 this month), Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg (84), and Stephen Breyer 
(79 next month) — represent the 
court’s oldest members, and there 
have been persistent rumors about 
Kennedy, who has written all the 
major gay rights decision over two 
decades, considering retirement.
Donald Trump’s fi rst appointee 
to the Court, Neil Gorsuch, replac-
ing the late arch-homophobe An-
tonin Scalia, immediately showed 
his own anti-LGBTQ colors with a 
disingenuous dissent from a June 
26 high court ruling that the 2015 
marriage equality decision compels 
Arkansas to list both mothers on 
their child’s birth certifi cate. Anoth-
er appointment like Gorsuch from 
Trump would seriously jeopardize 
the chances for any further prog-
ress on LGBTQ rights and equality 
in the foreseeable future.
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informed Boatright of the results 
in early 2015, Boatright became 
emotional and seemed very sin-
cere. Boatright told Mr. Osco that 
he had been in a relationship for 
two years and the only other per-
son he had sexual contact with was 
M.H. Boatright declined to name 
his partner, but indicated that he 
had told the partner about the pos-
sibility Boatright had HIV and his 
partner had thereafter tested neg-
ative.” In response to Osco inform-
ing Boatright about the 2011 test 
result, “Boatright maintained that 
he was never contacted by anyone 
about it.”
During his own testimony, Boa-
tright basically admitted he lied to 
Osco about his boyfriend’s HIV sta-
tus, stating that “his partner, who 
he was dating at the time he en-
gaged in sexual conduct with M.H., 
testifi ed positive for HIV in March 
2013.” According to Boatright’s 
testimony, however, the two men 
waited to have sex until after his 
boyfriend’s viral load was unde-
tectable and also used condoms.
Boatright also acknowledged 
that he and M.H. engaged in un-
protected sex “because he thought 
he was HIV-negative.”
The major point of contention 
in the case was whether Boatright 
could be charged with criminal li-
ability based on the evidence that 
he knew about his HIV status when 
he had sex with M.H. His defense 
depended on his testimony that he 
genuinely thought he was HIV-neg-
ative and fi rst learned he was posi-
tive when M.H. contacted him. Set 
against this was the testimony by 
Chapman, the CLS Plasma nurse, 
that she had counseled Boatright 
about his HIV status in December 
2012, which Boatright denied in 
court, and Osco’s testimony con-
fi rming that a record of Boatright’s 
2011 positive test result was in the 
Ohio reporting database.
In appealing his conviction and 
sentence, Boatright argued fi rst 
that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, but his attorney had not 
raised that objection during the 
trial, so the appeals court found he 
had lost his chance to make this 
argument. 
Boatright also contended that 
the trial judge should have dis-
missed the case rather than send-
ing it to the jury, on grounds of in-
suffi cient evidence for a conviction, 
but the appeals court rejected this 
out of hand, fi nding that in sort-
ing through the contradictory evi-
dence, the jury could reasonably 
have reached the conclusion that 
Boatright knew about his HIV-pos-
itive status and lied to M.H. before 
they had sex. The court empha-
sized that Boatright even admit-
ted during his testimony to having 
lied more than once — including 
when he fi lled out plasma donation 
forms and failed to disclose that 
he was a sexually active gay man 
who should have been rejected as 
a donor. 
Boatright explained that he did 
this because he was opposed to the 
categorical exclusion of gay men as 
donors. He “wanted to help people 
and did not think that his sexual 
orientation should prevent him 
from donating,” he testifi ed.
Carr’s opinion for the court stat-
ed, “After a thorough, independent 
review of the record, we conclude 
that the jury did not lose its way in 
fi nding Boatright guilty of feloni-
ous assault. The jury was present-
ed with two competing views of the 
evidence.” The appeals court would 
not overturn the verdict “merely 
because the trier of fact opted to 
believe the testimony of a particu-
lar witness.”
The court also rejected Boa-
tright’s challenge to the length of 
his sentence, observing that the 
range provided by the statute was 
between two and eight years, so a 
fi ve-year sentence was comfortably 
within the range.
Nor would the court entertain 
Boatright’s argument that his trial 
attorney presented an ineffective 
defense by failing to raise a con-
stitutional objection to the statute, 
pointing out that another appeals 
panel in Ohio had recently rejected 
a constitutional attack on the stat-
ute. Given the strong presumption 
of constitutionality accorded to 
statutes and Boatright’s failure to 
cite any legal authority to support 
the claim that it was a viable argu-
ment, the appeals court was un-
willing to fi nd fault with his trial 
attorney.
Boatright was represented in his 
appeal by Akron attorney James 
K. Reed.
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